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INTRODUCTION
Beginning almost two decades ago, I wrote a series of law review
articles about the nature of legal proof in the context of probabilistic
1
evidence or analysis. In these articles, I explored, in passing, some of
the differences between the legal system’s concept of proof of facts,
especially in the context of civil litigation, and the same subject as
seen by scientists, especially those analyzing empirical data.
I put that endeavor aside for what turned out to be an extended
period while my career took a different turn, focusing on the
intricacies of commercial law. In the last decade, much of my time
has been devoted to the problems of international commercial
transactions. In particular, a major portion of my work during this
time has involved the negotiation of various principles to govern
international transactions. In one case, I was the chair of a task force
within the drafting committee preparing Revised Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code which developed Article 9’s rules
governing international secured transactions from the perspective of
domestic United States law. In another case, I spent several years as a
member of the United States delegation to the working group of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) which developed an international convention (now
∗
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known as the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of
Receivables in International Trade). More recently, I have been a
delegate to UNCITRAL’s effort to develop an international legislative
guide for secured transactions.
I mention these international activities not to recite my resume
but, rather, because they relate in unexpected (to me, at least) ways
to the topic at hand in this symposium. In many of the international
negotiations in which I have been engaged, the most difficult paths to
resolution were not those that involved doctrines with respect to
which legal systems obviously differed. In those cases, representatives
of the relevant states were prepared for the advocacy and give-andtake that are part of the resolution of the differences in an
international forum. Rather, the greatest challenges to resolving
differences arose where legal systems used the same or similar words
to describe legal doctrines based on very different concepts. In these
areas, the delegates from the affected states had significant difficulty
understanding the fact that delegates from other states could be
using the same words to describe very different concepts. The result,
in many cases, was that there was often a greater appearance of
agreement than there was agreement itself.
Moreover, when
delegates finally discovered their disagreements, solutions were more
difficult to reach because the initial reactions to discovery of the
nature of the disagreement tended to be on the order of “[t]hey
don’t know what they’re talking about—that word just doesn’t mean
what they’re using it to mean!”
As a result, similarities in nomenclature first obscured
differences in substantive norms and then made these differences
more difficult to resolve. The result of such apparent agreement,
and more difficult resolution of disagreement, created by
inconsistent nomenclature can easily lead situations in which those
versed in different systems talk at each other, each convinced of the
inherent virtue of the concepts of his or her system, rather than learn
from each other.
At this point, a reader might ask how these difficulties in
international substantive law negotiations relate to the role of experts
in civil litigation. The answer, I believe, is that the relationship is
quite strong. When experts from other disciplines testify in a legal
proceeding, particularly when the proceeding is a fact-finding
exercise in civil litigation governed by standard burdens of
persuasion, rather than a criminal trial with its higher burden on the
prosecution, there is significant risk that the use, by law and the other
disciplines, of similar vocabulary to abbreviate materially different
concepts will result in mirages that can easily lead to inappropriate
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evidentiary and substantive decisions.
In this article, I focus on civil litigation, rather than on the
criminal process, because the legal system is much more open about
the meaning of the fact-finding process in civil litigation. While no
two people seem to agree on the meaning of the “beyond a
2
reasonable doubt” standard of proof in a criminal case, this is not the
case for civil litigation. In the civil context, the range of views as to
the meaning of the burden of persuasion is much narrower. In
particular, it seems well-accepted that the standard burden of
persuasion in civil cases—the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard—can be expressed probabilistically: the plaintiff (or other
party bearing the burden of persuasion) must demonstrate that the
3
probability of the facts supporting its case exceeds 0.5. This ability to
express the burden of persuasion probabilistically has several
implications. For one thing, it promises (but does not always deliver)
a conceptual link between legal proof standards and the standards of
scientific and technical disciplines that rely on probabilistic
reasoning. Second, and perhaps more important, it masks the
important differences in the value systems that govern standards of
legal proof and parallel standards of scientific and technical inquiry.
In particular, the standard of proof in civil litigation, and the value
system that lies beneath it, weigh the cost of errors so differently than
most scientific disciplines that the fact that a “mainstream” scientist
would not testify as to a particular conclusion does not necessarily
mean that the same conclusion is valueless or “junk science” for the
purposes of law.
I write this essay because I am quite concerned that the use of
4
rules generated by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and its
progeny to determine whether to admit scientific and technical
expert testimony will fall prey, and perhaps already has fallen prey, to
the “similar-words-but-differing-meaning” phenomenon that I have
5
described above. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, with its emphasis on
scientific knowledge, and Daubert, with its emphasis on acceptance in
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the scientific community, create a great risk that evidence that is
relevant to the demonstration of facts at issue in a civil proceeding
will be excluded or substantively minimized by misunderstandings
about how data (i.e., evidence) is utilized to develop statements of
“knowledge” in scientific communities consistent with the norms of
those communities—norms that differ fundamentally from the norms
6
of civil litigation. Because plaintiffs typically bear the burden of
persuasion in civil litigation, plaintiffs will likely bear the costs of this
misunderstanding. Even if one does not shed a tear for plaintiffs as a
general matter, however, I suggest that one should nonetheless be
concerned about the fact that such misunderstandings can increase
the amount and cost of errors in the civil litigation system.
Before continuing, I should point out at this juncture that my
lengthy sojourn from immersion in the fields of probability and
proof, combined with the fact that I am not, and do not purport to
be, an expert in the law of evidence generally, leads me to paint with
a somewhat broad brush. I am also likely to fall prey to the same
phenomenon that I described in the context of international
litigation; namely, that my use of various terms in this article may not
always be precisely consistent with their meaning as terms of art in
the world of evidence or in the world of probability and statistics.
Moreover, I have striven to use as little technical vocabulary as
possible in this essay, so as not to obscure my areas of concern.
Indeed, the legal system’s attempts to piggy-back on the language
used in scientific reasoning, rather than on the underlying reasoning
itself, may be part of the problem about which I am concerned.
Part I of this essay compares and contrasts the process by which
courts in civil litigation and scientists, particularly those in highly
empirical disciplines such as epidemiology (a frequent source of
scientific expertise in civil litigation), utilize the knowledge of
discrete and incomplete data about the possible existence of an
ultimate fact to form a conclusion as to whether that fact exists. Part
II of this essay identifies concerns emanating from the actual and
potential misunderstanding of these differences by courts. Finally,
Part III of this essay sketches out the contours of a theory explaining
why the Daubert model of gatekeeping might be appropriate to filter
out “junk,” but inappropriate when used to filter out legitimate
analysis that is sensitive to the needs of civil litigation.
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I. FACT-FINDING IN LAW AND SCIENCE
While some aspects of science are highly theoretical and
deductive, many other aspects are inductive. In this context, I use
“inductive” not so much as a description of the reasoning process as a
description of the knowledge development process. Although the
process of generating theories or models from higher (or earlier
established) principles already known or believed to be true is
deductive, the process of testing these theories—examining the
factual evidence to see if the theories work as promised—is inductive.
Most scientific endeavors contain this inductive, or fact-inferential,
aspect.
Some disciplines, such as epidemiology, are largely
dominated by it.
Similarly, while much of legal reasoning is deductive (minor
rules that follow from the existence of a major rule are typically
determined by deductive reasoning), much of the legal system follows
an inductive path.
The legal realists certainly realized this.
Moreover, some of the most renowned examples of modern
lawmaking, such as Llewellyn’s UCC, overtly used inductive reasoning
to find governing legal principles from the realities of business
practice, rather than the other way around. Yet, the inductive nature
of much of the legal system is not limited to rule-creation. In
particular, the process of finding facts at trial is inductive.
Not only do law and science share this inductive approach to
reaching factual conclusions, they both use words like “prove” (or
similar words such as “demonstrate”) to describe what they do. Yet,
while people often speak of legal “proof” or scientific “proof” as
though they are akin to mathematical or logical proof, this is
certainly not the case. Mathematical proofs are either valid or flawed
depending on the logical rigor by which one moves from the initial
premise to the conclusion. Legal proof and scientific proof are quite
different from mathematical proof; so much so that it is in many ways
remarkable that they share the same key word—“proof”—with
mathematical proof. Legal and scientific proof would perhaps more
accurately be described as “fact finding” or, even better, “fact
inferring.” These disciplines do not traverse a logical route from
premise to conclusion but, rather, traverse a route from individual
data points of information—fact evidence—to inferences about
ultimate facts at issue. Both law and science are willing to draw such
inferences, and both have standards to determine when such
inferences may be drawn. The standards in the legal world are more
formal, even if often stated casually or incompletely. Conversely,
although the standards governing inference from data in scientific
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disciplines are more a product of custom and informal consensus
than of formal normative mechanisms, they are typically expressed
more formally than the norms of the legal system.
Thus, in neither empirical science nor in litigation are facts
“proven” in any rigorous sense of the word. Rather, facts relevant to
the proposition sought to be proved or disproved (sometimes called
the probandum) are considered and, if those facts lead the decision
maker to conclude that the probability that the probandum is accurate
is sufficiently high, the matter is pronounced proven (or
7
demonstrated). This is an important point. In epidemiology, for
example, the scientist typically does not profess knowledge of the
underlying biological mechanism causing a particular medical
problem. Instead, the epidemiologist utilizes various probabilistic
techniques to examine the degree of association between the
suspected “cause” and the undesired “effect.” Similarly, in litigation,
unless the facts sought to be “proven” consist of an event that takes
place in front of jury, the facts are not really proven in the sense of
either actual knowledge or logical proof. Instead, other facts, such as
the testimony of fact witnesses, are brought to the attention of the
factfinder, and the factfinder must decide whether these other facts
lead the factfinder to assess the probability of the probandum as being
sufficiently high. Even in the case of eyewitness testimony, the
process is ultimately probabilistic—the factfinder must assess the
likelihood that the witness’s perceptions were accurate and that he or
8
she is testifying truthfully about those perceptions. In other words,
while those who report the results of epidemiological or legal factfinding typically speak of “proof,” neither of those disciplines really
engage in proof in the more formal sense of the term. Rather, they
engage in something very different—the drawing of inferences from
incomplete information. This observation is not a criticism of either
law or science; rather, it is simply a description of what they do. It is
this “proof” process, however, in which the role of experts is debated.
II. MISUNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LAW AND SCIENCE
Given the similarities between legal fact-finding and scientific
fact-finding, it may appear that both disciplines are engaging in the
same endeavor. Thus, scientists arguably should be able to speak
easily to a legal audience about facts that have been found or
demonstrated in science, with the concept of such demonstration
neither gaining nor losing meaning. In my opinion, though, the
7
8
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apparent synonymity between legal proof and scientific proof is
chimerical.
Although the two types of “proof” share both
superficially similar vocabulary and the basic goal of drawing
inference from incomplete data, they approach these endeavors in
fundamentally different ways.
Associate Justice Harry Blackmun seemed to realize this ten
years ago in Daubert, when he wrote:
[T]here are important differences between the quest for truth in
the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory.
Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on
the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The
scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging
consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are
incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an
advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use,
however, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding
legal judgment—often of great consequence—about a particular
set of events in the past. We recognize that, in practice, a
gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably
on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic
9
insights and innovations.

In my view, Justice Blackmun got this exactly right, and then
proceeded to get it exactly wrong. I believe that Justice Blackmun
was correct as to the existence of “important differences between the
quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the
10
laboratory.” More importantly, though, I think that his statement in
Daubert turned the implications of those important differences on
their heads.
Justice Blackmun seemed to think that science
sometimes relies on a fact-finding thought process that is
insufficiently rigorous and inappropriate for the legal system and,
thus, should be filtered out. I would argue that the opposite is true.
Science, particularly empirical science that relies on statistical or
other probabilistic methods, routinely uses filters that prevent its
experts from reaching exactly the sort of opinions as to the truth of
ultimate facts that should be utilized in a civil trial governed by the
preponderance of the evidence rule.
In particular, there are three main differences between the
process of formulating scientific conclusions and the process of
formulating factual conclusions. First, the two systems have very
different explicit and implicit value judgments concerning the

9
10
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relative costs of errors. Standards of factual inference used in the
world of science tend to assume that the costs associated with
inaccurately determining that a proposition is proven or
demonstrated—the costs of inaccurately discarding what many call
the “null hypothesis”—are much greater than the costs of
inaccurately declining to conclude that the proposition has been
11
proven or demonstrated even though the proposition is true. One
of the premises of civil litigation, on the other hand, is that the
societal cost of errors favoring the plaintiff is the same as the societal
12
cost of errors favoring the defendant. To put it another way, the
preponderance of the evidence standard suggests that the civil
litigation system ascribes essentially equal costs to inaccurately
proclaiming a proposition to be demonstrated and to inaccurately
declining to proclaim that the proposition has been demonstrated.
Second, science is comfortable with a fact inference process that
creates a broad category of “suggested but not proven” facts. That is,
scientific analysis of empirical data frequently leads to indeterminate
conclusions that, if fully expressed, could be summarized as:
The information collected in this study is consistent with the
proposition that A is correlated with B (and, indeed, does not
support the proposition that A is not correlated with B) but,
because the amount of information is relatively small, we cannot
comfortably rule out the possibility that our observations are a
product of chance rather than true correlation, and, therefore,
we will not conclude at this time that the correlation exists. We
must emphasize, though, that this does not mean that we
conclude that the correlation does not exist.

Historically, the civil legal system has not utilized this sort of nonfinding. In a trial, the facts are either proven or not—either the
plaintiff wins or the defendant wins. While Scotland distinguishes
13
between verdicts of “innocent” and “not proven” in criminal trials,
there is no analog in American civil litigation. While the concept of
equipoise exists in civil litigation, it is usually conceptualized as a
narrow, knife-edged tie—a finding of a 50-50 balance in the
14
probability assessment by the factfinder. Thus, in a sense, scientific
11
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14
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incorporate the idea of “confidence intervals” which would, in their operation, create
a small category of “not proven,” even in civil litigation. See supra note 1. I note,
however, that the costs of pro-plaintiff errors and pro-defendant errors in civil
litigation should be equal and, thus, the legal “confidence intervals” would be
narrower than those typically used in science. As a result, application of my theories
12
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factfinders have available three possible answers to the question of
whether A is associated with B: (i) no, (ii) yes, and (iii) “the evidence
suggests yes, but we are not yet ready to proclaim that the answer is
yes because the evidence could be an artifact of chance.” On the
other hand, legal factfinders in the context of civil litigation have
only two answers truly available: yes and no. The legal system, faced
with the scientific trichotomy, typically, yet mistakenly, translates the
third scientific answer into a simple “no.”
Third, the process of finding facts in the context of civil
litigation is a “one-shot deal.” Either the plaintiff has proven her
facts, or she has not, but she has only one chance to make her case—
now and forever. This is assuredly not the approach of the world of
science. In that world, a conclusion of “suggested but not proven”
simply means that there is more work to be done (and often is used
as the argument for funding that work). In other words, the scientific
verdict of “not proven” can be translated to “stay tuned.” Law,
however, does not stay tuned. After one trial, it tunes out.
In many ways, the points I have summarized above with respect
to science have their strongest resonance in scientific disciplines such
as epidemiology, in which the inferential reasoning is most overtly
statistical and as to which the admissibility of expert testimony
appears to be most frequently challenged. If the question at hand is
whether A causes B (or, to avoid the various conundra associated with
causation, whether A is associated with B), an epidemiologist does
not examine the physical mechanism by which A and B might be
connected (such as, for example, the cell biology of why exposure to
benzene may be associated with increases in certain cancers). Rather,
an epidemiologist examines raw data (whether collected by the
epidemiologist or others) and performs statistical analysis. Typically,
the epidemiologist will utilize both descriptive and inferential
statistics with the output being a descriptive statement about the
observed relationship between A and B in the data set being
examined and an inferential statement that considers the possibility
that the described facts could have occurred simply by chance in the
absence of the relationship suggested by the observation. Most
commonly, the epidemiologist will decline to characterize the data as
showing a particular relationship between A and B unless the
probability that the relationship could have occurred by chance even
in the absence of the observed relationship is quite low. The most
would result in a somewhat broader concept of equipoise than the classical view, but
it would still leave that category much narrower than the scientific “suggested but not
demonstrated” category.
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common threshold for such a probability is 5%. Sometimes, an
epidemiologist or similar researcher will provide the descriptive
statistics along with an analysis stating at what significance level (i.e.,
the probability that the results would occur by chance in the absence
of the observed relationship) the descriptive statistics are
“significant.” In such cases, the epidemiologist, or the user of his or
her studies, will typically not place weight on observed results that are
15
not significant at the 5%, or 0.05, level.
Let us go through this a bit more carefully and specifically.
Epidemiologists and similar scientific analysts of empirical data often
describe their hypothesis testing process as determining whether they
have disproved a “null hypothesis” of the absence of the point sought
16
to be proved. In the case of a possible toxic substance, for example,
the null hypothesis is that the substance is not toxic. After examining
the evidence, an epidemiologist may pronounce the null hypothesis
as disproven, or not. If it is disproven, the null hypothesis of no
relationship is rejected. If it is not pronounced disproven, whether
because the evidence supports the null hypothesis or because the
evidence does not support it but the possibility that the evidence was
created by chance rather than by the falsity of the null hypothesis is
too high, null hypothesis is not rejected.
In other words, data can fail to “disprove” the null hypothesis for
two very different reasons: (i) the evidence is consistent with null
hypothesis, (ii) the evidence is inconsistent with the null hypothesis
but, given the amount and nature of the data and of the null and
alternative hypotheses, the epidemiologist or similar scientist cannot
sufficiently rule out the possibility that the apparent inconsistency
results solely from the luck of the draw.
Take a simple example—a public opinion poll. If 100 people
are interviewed and 98 say that they will vote for the Democratic
presidential candidate, that would certainly be sufficient to disprove
17
the null hypothesis of a Republican victory. Similarly, if 98 of the
interviewees indicate that they will vote for the Republican, that
would clearly be consistent with the hypothesis of Republican victory.
If, however, 52 of the 100 state that they will vote for the Democrat
15

See generally T. WONNACOTT & R. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS § 19-1, at 539-43 (2d ed. 1977).
16
See H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 113-14 (2d ed. 1972).
17
In this oversimplified example, I am, of course, painting with an even broader
brush than normal. Obviously, a laundry list of assumptions—such as, for example,
that the interviewees truly represent a random sample and that they will vote for the
same candidate whom they indicated to the pollster they would support—should
qualify this statement.
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and 48 state that they will vote for the Republican, the pollster does
not state that a Democratic victory is imminent; rather, the pollster
will state that the race is “too close to call.” Thus, in both the second
and third situations, the pollster will not reject the null hypothesis of
a Republican victory. Yet, if one asked the pollster in the second and
third cases what election result she would predict if she had to make a
prediction based solely on the polling data, it seems obvious that
those predictions would differ.
These two decisions to decline to reject the null hypothesis are
very different. In the first case, the facts are consistent with the null
hypothesis. If anything, the evidence makes us believe in the null
hypothesis even more. In the second case, though, the facts are not
what one would expect if the null hypothesis were true. Indeed, the
facts should make one have some additional doubts about the null
hypothesis.
An epidemiologist declines to rule out the null
hypothesis in the second case not because the facts support the null
hypothesis—they do not—but because the inconsistent facts are of
questionable robustness. The probability that they could occur just
by coincidence if the null hypothesis is true is too high for comfort.
The first type of declining to reject the null hypothesis is akin to
a verdict of innocent—the factfinder is confident of the truth of the
null hypothesis. The second situation, though, is more akin to the
Scottish verdict of not proven. That verdict does not involve a
statement as to the ultimate truth or falsity of the probandum or the
null hypothesis. It is, as Charles Nesson might say, a statement about
18
the evidence, rather than the event.
It is a statement that the
evidence, in light of formal and informal burdens of persuasion, is
insufficient to establish a particular hypothesis, even though the facts
suggest the truth of that hypothesis.
Nonetheless, in either case, epidemiology pronounces that the
null hypothesis has not been disproven. It is important to note that
this is not very different from adjudication in our criminal justice
system, in which the conclusions of “not proven” and “innocent” are
combined in the single verdict of “not guilty.” There is one key
difference, of course. A legal verdict of not guilty ends the matter
19
once and for all. A scientific verdict of not proven is merely one
step in a continuing effort to ascertain how the world works.
Again, the epidemiological verdict declining to rule out the null
hypothesis does not mean that the null hypothesis is, indeed, true, or
that the epidemiologist believes it to be true. It may be false, and the
18
19

See Nesson, supra note 3.
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epidemiologist may have a personal belief that it is (probably) false.
The “not proven” statement means only that the epidemiologist
declines to proclaim it false because, within the scientific system in which
the epidemiologist operates, the cost of a wrongful proclamation that null
hypothesis is disproven is higher than the cost of inaccurate silence as
to the disproof of the null hypothesis when that hypothesis is, indeed,
disproven.
Thus, there are situations in which, if a wealth maximizing
epidemiologist were forced to place a wager at even odds as to
whether the null hypothesis is true or false, without the option of
declining to bet, she would place her bet on the proposition that the
hypothesis is false, even though, in the system in which she operates,
the conventional balancing of costs of errors leads to a statement that
the invalidity of the null hypothesis is “not proven.”
To put this another way, epidemiologists and similar scientists
are given three choices to describe the results of their inquiries: (i)
the evidence is consistent with the null hypothesis; (ii) the evidence is
inconsistent such that we are sufficiently confident the evidence did
not result from chance; and (iii) evidence is inconsistent with the
null hypothesis but too close to the line for the investigator to go out
on a limb with an unnecessary proclamation.
If the scientific conclusion about the evidence is such that an
assessment of the truth proposition under consideration is “too close
to call,” science doesn’t stop. Rather, one more item is added to the
pile of things about which we have not reached a firm conclusion, but
to which we may return at some future date.
Let us now return to fact-finding in the context of civil litigation.
In civil litigation, the vocabulary is similar, but the analysis is quite
different. As in science, the rules of civil litigation do not demand
that plaintiff “prove” its case in any real sense. Logical proof is not
required. Neither is proof by the exclusion of all other possibilities,
nor by the demonstration that the probability of the probandum
equals or closely approaches 1.0. Rather, all that is required is that
the plaintiff demonstrate that the probandum of his or her case is
more likely than not to be true. In other words, all that is required is
a probability greater than or equal to 0.5.
This preponderance of the evidence standard means that the
legal system is willing to tolerate errors in either direction in the
adjudication of civil cases.
This is different from criminal
prosecution, where the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard
explicitly indicates the existence of a strong negative societal value for
false convictions by indicating that society does not want to convict
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the defendant unless the factfinders are virtually sure of the
defendant’s guilt and, concomitantly, society’s willingness to acquit
those who are “probably” guilty but not indubitably so. Thus, the
implicit “error economics” of criminal prosecution are such that the
cost of a false conviction is much higher than the cost of an
20
inaccurate acquittal.
The error weighting of civil litigation is very different from this
criminal justice proof model. By providing that the plaintiff wins if
the probability of the probandum is even slightly greater than 0.5, and
that the plaintiff loses even if that probability is slightly less than 0.5,
the legal system has implicitly told us that the cost of a factually
inaccurate verdict for the plaintiff is essentially the same as the cost of
a factually inaccurate verdict for the defendant. After all, the system
is telling us both that the plaintiff should prevail if the probability of
the facts at issue is 0.51 (and, thus, there is a forty-nine percent
chance that the verdict is factually inaccurate and that the cost of this
error will be borne by the defendant) and the defendant should
prevail even if the probability of the plaintiff’s facts is 0.49 (and, thus,
there is a forty-nine percent chance that the verdict is factually
inaccurate and that the cost of this error will be borne by the
plaintiff).
The civil litigation proof model is also very different from the
implicit rules in scientific decision making described above. As
noted, the process of scientific inquiry often results in evidence that
does not support the null hypothesis, but which does not differ from
that hypothesis to an extent that survives significance testing at the
selected threshold—usually the 0.05 standard. In the world of
science, this failure of the evidence countering the null hypothesis to
survive significance testing does not disqualify the subject-matter
from further inquiry, resulting in a permanent scientific decision in
favor of the null hypothesis. Rather, it is an invitation of sorts for
further research (and grant applications) to gather sufficient data to
determine whether this will yield an inference against the null
hypothesis that is significant.
In civil litigation, on the other hand, the verdicts and
consequences, associated with the factfinders’ conclusion that either
20

See Utah v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353 (Utah 1957) (“It is better that ten guilty go
free, than that one innocent be punished.”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970) (“We do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as the
equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty.”); D. Michael
Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and “Legitimate Moral Force”—
Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 442-45
(1998); Alexander Volokh, Aside: Guilty Men, 146 U. PENN L. REV. 173 (1997).
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the null hypothesis (absence of facts resulting in liability) is
supported by the evidence or that matters are “too close to call”—i.e.,
in equipoise—are identical: the plaintiff loses and cannot relitigate
the case. There is no opportunity to put off a final verdict until more
data can, perhaps, be gathered in the future and no opportunity to
relitigate if and when such data are available.
In light of the finality (against the plaintiff) associated with a
conclusion that matters are too close to call, it is not surprising, then,
that the “too close to call” region—i.e., equipoise—is traditionally
conceptualized as razor thin in models of proof subject to the
preponderance of the evidence standard. Most models hypothesize a
very simple proof mechanism, in which the probability of the facts at
issue is ascertained (whether with rigor or by seat-of-the-pants
calculus), and if the probability of the probandum is less than 0.5 or
exactly equal to 0.5 the plaintiff loses. If the plaintiff demonstrates a
probability even a hair’s breadth greater than 0.5, however, the
21
plaintiff prevails.
To put this another way, by analogy to statistical terms, the civil
litigation system tends to act as though the only relevant piece of
probabilistic information that need be considered in determining
whether the evidence supports a verdict for the plaintiff is the “point
estimate” of the probability of the plaintiff’s facts. The concept of a
“confidence interval” surrounding the point estimate, the choice of a
significance level utilized to construct that interval, the size of the
resulting interval, and whether that interval straddles the 0.5
threshold, are not considered in the current model.
As noted previously, several years ago I suggested a more
nuanced model of civil proof, utilizing the statistical concept of
confidence intervals to explain a somewhat broader area of equipoise
in which the plaintiff does not prevail. I suggested that
this new model clarifies the practical content within the concept
of equipoise. Situations in equipoise—in which neither party can
meet the burden of persuasion—would include not only
situations where the true probability is exactly 0.5 but also all
situations in which the interval estimate of the probability of the
facts supporting liability straddles 0.5. In any such case, the
evidence provided by the parties would be insufficient to allow the
factfinder to state with sufficient confidence that the probability
that the facts support either party’s position exceeds 0.5.
21

See, e.g., John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV.
1065 (1968); Lozowick et al., Law and Quantitative Multivariate Analysis: An Encounter,
66 MICH. L. REV. 1641 (1968); Zeisel, Statistics as Legal Evidence, 15 INT’L
ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI. 246 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
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Accordingly, in these cases it is important to determine which
party will suffer for that mutual inability. Under the reformulated
definition of the quantum of the burden of persuasion, allocation
of the burden determines who will lose when the factfinder
cannot determine with the requisite amount of confidence on
22
which side of 0.5 the true probability lies.

Even in my model, though, the nether region of indeterminacy
would be narrower than the corresponding region in the sciences. I
argue strongly that the significance level that determines the size of
confidence interval for legal proof should be determined by the
values of civil litigation, in which pro-plaintiff errors and prodefendant errors are assumed to carry equal societal costs, not the
values of epidemiology and similar sciences, where inaccurate
proclamations of fact are more disfavored than silence when the facts
23
are true.
The upshot of all this is that, whether one follows the traditional
model of civil proof or my alternative model, the process and
structure of making legal fact-finding decisions from available
evidence is quite different from the process and structure of making
fact-finding decisions from available evidence in much of the
scientific world. As noted earlier, not only do the two systems place
different relative values on the different types of fact-finding errors,
but they differ as to the number of opportunities for the proponent
of an idea to make his or her case, and the consequences of
indeterminate evidence. The legal system gives each plaintiff only
one chance to prove his or her case, with a limited role for the
concept of equipoise. Epidemiological and other scientific factfinding, on the other hand, do not limit the opportunity to reach a
conclusion to a single investigation, and build into the decision
process a serious role for equipoise. Even apart from the other
differences, this broad concept of equipoise, in which the null
hypothesis is deemed not to have been disproven, casts a pro-null
hypothesis bias into the assessment of whether any particular set of
data leads to the conclusion that the probability of the null
hypothesis is less than 0.5. Translating this bias to civil litigation
would transform it into a pro-defendant bias.
It may be easier to see the difference between the two systems by
describing them in terms of wagers. Models of scientific proof could

22

See Confidence in Probability, supra note 1, at 419.
Compare Conceptualizing Proof, supra note 1, with David H. Kaye, Apples and
Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 54
(1987).
23
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be described as a wager in which the scientist/gambler has three
choices: he or she may bet on the truth of the null hypothesis, bet on
the falsity of the null hypothesis, or decline to place a bet at this time
because the facts currently available render the matter too close to
call with a high degree of confidence.
Moreover, if the
scientist/gambler opts for the too close to call option, he or she may
place a bet at a later time if additional facts are developed that lead
the scientist/gambler to a different conclusion.
Legal proof
governed by the preponderance of the evidence standard, on the
other hand, as noted earlier, allows the legal factfinder to choose
from only two possible wagers—the factfinder must bet, at even odds,
either for or against the plaintiff’s facts. Quite obviously, as
factfinders forced to wager our own money, many of us would decline
to bet if the evidence in a particular case left matters so close that it
was difficult to separate meaningful inferences from the role of
24
chance, but the choice of betting is not allowed legal factfinders.
Moreover, a legal factfinder cannot return and cast a different bet if
additional evidence is developed in the future.
I have explored these differences in legal decision making and
scientific decision making—differences that are profound despite the
similarities of language used to describe them—because I fear that
these differences are not recognized by courts that must make
decisions about scientific evidence, particularly evidence that the
scientific world examines through a probabilistic lens.
Indeed, some post-Daubert cases suggest that the deference to
the methods of the world of scientific decision making is already
beginning to have the undesirable effect of confusing scientific and
legal values, and the norms that follow from them. An example is
provided by a decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in one of the
Bendectin cases, declining to give credence to epidemiological
testimony utilizing a significance standard less rigorous than the
traditional 0.05 standard. According to that court:
We think it unwise to depart from the methodology that is at
present generally accepted among epidemiologists. See generally
Bert Black, The Supreme Court’s View of Science: Has Daubert
Exorcised the Certainty Demon?, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2129, 2135
(1994) (stating that “‘[a]lmost all thoughtful scientists would
agree . . . that [a significance level of five percent] is a reasonable
general standard’” (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor
Alvan R. Feinstein in Support of Respondent at 16, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.
24

See Conceptualizing Proof, supra note 1.
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2d 469 (1993) (No. 92-102))). Accordingly, we should not widen
the boundaries at which courts will acknowledge a statistically
significant association beyond the 95% level to 90% or lower
25
values.

The Havner decision was rendered in the context of sufficiency
of evidence rather than admissibility of evidence. Nonetheless, the
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Texas does not appear to be
limited to that context. Indeed, the journey from a conclusion that
use of a significance level other than 0.05 renders epidemiological
inference insufficient on which to base fact-finding to a conclusion
that the use of such a significance also renders it inadmissible is
26
minuscule.
Moreover, it should be noted that the Havner court’s analysis was
not reached casually and without serious thought. The Havner
opinion quotes the assertion of one of the plaintiff’s experts that a
27
significance level of 0.10 should be used and the explanation of
another expert that “[you] don’t ever see [confidence intervals of
50% or 60%] in a scientific study because that means we’re going to
28
miss it a lot of times and [scientists] are not willing to take that risk.”
In addition, the court noted that a pre-Daubert federal district court
had concluded “that the scientific standard for determining
causation is much stricter than the standard employed by the court
and that confidence levels of 95%, 90%, or even 80% should not be
29
required.”
Thus, the Havner court was well-aware that legal decision making
need not follow norms of scientific decision making, yet it decided
nonetheless to yoke the two together. Accordingly, the spectre of
barring the testimony of scientific experts because their threshold
standard for willingness to conclude that a particular set of facts
clearly exists. This is a part of a general failure of the legal system to
understand the implications of the methods of scientific decision
making and their effect on legal decision making.
Thus, I believe that there is reason to be seriously concerned
that unthinking conformity to scientific decision making standards
suggested by Daubert will have a serious substantive impact on civil
litigation—especially litigation about facts that are incompletely
25

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 724 (Texas
1997).
26
See also Finley, supra note 6.
27
953 S.W.2d at 717-18.
28
953 S.W.2d at 724.
29
Id. (quoting Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1117, 111920 (D. Idaho 1990)).
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understood. Of course, admitting the testimony of scientific experts
whose conclusions would not be reached by applying scientific
standards of decision making under uncertainty will result in some
errors. That goes without saying—in fact-finding under conditions of
uncertainty, of course mistakes will be made. But civil litigation does
not presume the same obsession with avoiding the error of premature
conclusion as does science, which can always re-examine matters
again in the future. The tragedy of equating legal fact-finding
governed by the preponderance standard with scientific fact-finding
is that the cost of the errors caused by this obsession—costs that are
borne primarily by plaintiffs—will be discounted or ignored entirely.
The result would be a sub silentio imposition of the values inherent in
scientific decision making on the very different world of civil
litigation.
Let us return to Justice Blackmun in Daubert. Justice Blackmun
recognized these differences, but suggested that the implication is
that law should filter out what science considers. As I see it, it is just
the opposite—law should allow in conclusions that science filters out.
III. BLACK BOXES AND CLEAR BOXES
I think that the problem about which I am concerned may be
caused in part by an implicit assumption by Daubert as to the nature of
scientific and similar expert testimony. Daubert seems to assume a
“black box” model of scientific and other expert testimony in which
data is given to the expert (or developed by the expert himself or
herself), the expert puts the data into a “black box” in which his or
her analysis takes place out of sight of the factfinders, and out pops a
conclusion. An example of that model might be provided by a
proffered handwriting expert, who is given samples of the
defendant’s handwriting and the document in question, analyzes
them, and pronounces the document to have been written (or not to
have been written) by the defendant. While the expert might recite
the factors that lead him or her to the conclusion, the process by
which those factors are weighed and balanced, as well as the
justification for using those factors and not others, takes place in the
expert’s mind.
Close examination of the Daubert criteria—testing to see if the
expert’s theory can be falsified, whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication, the known or
potential rate of error of the scientific technique in question, and
general acceptance within the scientific community—reveals that
they are attuned to determining whether such a black box should be
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trusted.
In addition, the Daubert criteria, and the gatekeeping function
that they animate, is based on an assumption that judges will be
better than jurors at identifying and excluding untrustworthy black
boxes, and the experts who propose to use them. This paternalistic
30
view of the court, as Joseph Sanders calls it, would seem to depend
for its validity on the accuracy of that assumption. Are judges indeed
better than jurors in choosing when to disregard the “scientific”
claims of charlatans and hired guns? If the answer to this question is
no, the gatekeeper function would seem to rest on dubious
assumptions. Moreover, if judges filter out more invalid black boxes,
but at the cost of also filtering out more valid black boxes that are
inaccurately seen as insufficient for admissibility under the Daubert
criteria, one cannot say that the paternalistic role is justified without
examining the cost of the factually mistaken verdicts that result from
inaccurate exclusion of testimony. One cannot count only the
positive value of the tuna captured in a efficient net; one must also
count the cost of the innocent dolphins inadvertently destroyed by
the same net.
Yet, as discussed in this essay, the sort of expertise that appears
often in civil litigation is not “black box” expertise such as the
testimony of handwriting experts.
Rather, the testimony of
epidemiologists and scientists using similar methods to extract
empirical judgments from individualistic data, is based on expertise
that takes place in a “clear box” in which the entire thought process
of the expert can be monitored and assessed.
Imagine an epidemiologist who offers to testify as follows
(transformed into an imaginary version both wordier than one would
expect to see in actual testimony and somewhat oversimplified for
ease of discussion) in a lawsuit claiming that a drug manufacturer
should be liable for health problems related to high blood pressure
allegedly caused by allergy medication sold by that manufacturer:
In a study of two groups of 100 otherwise similar women, one
group taking the particular allergy medication and the other
group taking no allergy medication, two of the women in the
unmedicated group developed high blood pressure, while six of
the women in the medicated group developed high blood
pressure. This difference (2% versus 6%) suggests that more than
half of the cases of high blood pressure in the medicated group
resulted from the medication. Of course, though, this observed

30

Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881 (2003).

962

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:943

difference may not reflect a real difference resulting from the
medication; even if the two groups are composed of otherwise
equivalent women, it is possible that the medication has no effect
on high blood pressure rates and the observed difference is
simply a result of random fluctuations. As an epidemiologist, I
am familiar with probability theory.
Applying standard
probabilistic models of binomial distributions, I can tell you that,
if the medication had absolutely no affect on high blood pressure
rates, we could expect to see the observed data (that are
suggestive of such a relationship) approximately X% of the time.
I would not proclaim in an academic paper the existence of a link
between the medication and high blood pressure because X% is
greater than 5% (a common epidemiological standard for making
such a proclamation); rather, I would write that the link is
suggested by the data but does meet stringent scientific standards
designed to minimize accidental proclamation of inaccurate
findings—even at the cost of failing to proclaim accurate
findings—and, therefore, additional studies should be done to
determine if this suggested connection actually exists. But you
have not asked me to present an academic paper; you have asked
me to help you conclude, in a setting in which you have only one
chance to get it right, and in which mistakes in either direction
are deemed to be equally costly, whether there is such a link. In
light of those two factors, which are not present in my academic
milieu, I would not use the 5% significance level to filter out
suggestions that emerge from the data. In this setting, I would set
the threshold somewhat lower, which I believe more accurately
reflects the balance of considerations in this setting. The
observed link between the medication and high blood pressure
would occur less than Y% of the time if there were no actual link.
Thus, the key question is whether significance at the Y% level is
sufficient to consider the observed relationship. In light of the
purposes of civil litigation as I understand them, Y% would
appear to be sufficient but, of course, I understand that this
choice does not belong solely to me. Thus, while I would
conclude, for the purposes of this factfinding endeavor, that the
medication appears to be linked to high blood pressure, I urge
you to decide the relative risks and costs of errors that flow from
inaccurately finding a link and from inaccurately finding that
there is no link, and determine a significance level appropriate
for that task and compare that significance level to Y% in order to
decide whether to accept my testimony as evidence of a link.

There is no “black box” in this testimony. All of the proffered
31
testimony is transparent—the box is clear. The expertise consists of
31

Actually, I suppose some of the calculations, such as the binomial probabilities
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a recital of data points already found or assumed, followed by a
summary of what the data show and a step-by-step explication of what
probability theory tells us about the likelihood that a different state of
affairs. It concludes with an overt statement of the expert’s opinion,
accompanied by directions on how to utilize the data based on the
factfinder’s choice of significance level.
Examining the Daubert criteria in the context of scientific
expertise of this sort reveals their utter inapplicability to it. The
expert is proffering no theory that is subject to falsification. The
techniques of inferential statistics have obviously been subject to peer
review, but this is not necessarily the case with respect to the expert’s
exposition concerning the use of significance levels. The scientific
technique of evaluating the evidence has no error rate—it is, itself,
merely a statement about error rates! Finally, the testimony discloses
on its face that the method the expert suggests for resolving the factfinding endeavor in a legal setting is not generally accepted for use in
the scientific community. I suggest that the Daubert criteria provide
little or no guidance for this sort of testimony. I would further
suggest that in the litigation described above, the proffered evidence
should be admitted.
One might respond that this case is too easy. Of course it is. I
constructed it to make a point. If, however, we make the case a bit
more realistic by deleting much of the explanation from the expert’s
testimony, we would be left with the same core of fact-finding (“I
would conclude, for the purposes of this fact-finding endeavor, that
the medication appears to be linked to high blood pressure . . . .”),
reached by a scientifically nonstandard method of reasoning that is
hard to justify under the Daubert tests. Daubert gatekeeping creates
too great a risk that this sort of testimony—accurate as to facts,
helpful as to probabilistic analysis, and with implicit value judgments
in the choice of significance levels so easily illuminated by crossexamination that there is no need to protect the factfinders by
exclusion of the testimony—will nonetheless be excluded.
A believer in the paternalistic model might still justify the
gatekeeper role with the assertion that judges can better evaluate
analyses of this sort than can juries, but I doubt that a strong case has
been made for the truth of this assertion. Comparative studies of the
likelihood of judges and juries falling for common statistical fallacies
tell only part of the story. We must also consider the possibility of
referred to in the proffered testimony, emerge from a black box. These too, however,
could be explained, albeit at greater length, so that all of the expert’s reasoning
would be transparent.
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unwarranted hostility to statistical and probabilistic proof on the part
of the judiciary. After all, the judge as gatekeeper in civil litigation is
justifiable only if the cost of errors from wrongful judicial filtering-out
of “good” testimony is less than cost of errors from the jury
wrongfully believing “junk.” Since, in civil litigation, the societal cost
of the two errors is presumed to be equal, this means that role of
judges as filters enhances accuracy in fact-finding only if there will be
fewer errors from wrongful judicial filtering than from wrongful jury
gullibility.
A casual perusal of court decisions should rob anyone of the
delusion that black robes provide immunity from that sort of error.
More common are whoppers like that of Justice Powell, casually
dismissing statistical evidence of racial disparities in death penalty
sentencing in McCleskey v. Kemp:”
Even a sophisticated multiple-regression analysis such as the
Baldus study can only demonstrate a risk that the factor of race
entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a necessarily
lesser risk that race entered into any particular sentencing
32
decision.”

Somehow, Justice Powell did not choose to point out that even
the fact that an eyewitness testifies that she saw a particular event
occur also only demonstrates that there is a risk (i.e., a probability)
that the event has occurred. The factfinder must take into account
(explicitly or implicitly) such factors as whether the witness had a
motive to lie, the possibility that the witness, whether or not she had a
motive to lie did, in fact, make statements at variance with her
memory of the event, whether the witness sincerely misremembers
events, and whether the witness’s eyesight or hearing led the witness
to believe she saw or heard something that did not happen, all
leading ultimately to a probabilistic judgment as to whether the event
occurred.
In other words, eyewitness testimony “can only
demonstrate a risk that” the allegedly witnessed event occurred.
Somehow, though, it seems unlikely that Justice Powell would have so
glibly dismissed a case based on eyewitness testimony on the ground
that the testimony established only a risk. Rather, it appears that he
simply was reluctant to utilize overtly probabilistic testimony to make
an important decision. Perhaps important societal values, not
33
identified by Justice Powell, justify this reluctance . Minimizing the
cost of errors (or at least optimizing them)—the touchstone of the
preponderance standard in civil litigation—does not appear to justify
32
33

481 U.S 279, 292 n.7 (1987).
See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 3.
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it, though.
Accordingly, it is not clear to me that we are better off with
judges as gatekeepers of “clear box” scientific testimony in civil cases.
The Daubert criteria do not apply well, and the virtue of the judiciary
as a filter of otherwise-relevant evidence in order to enhance the
accuracy of verdicts is far from clear.

